

U. S. Government versus Commercial Markets & Acquisitions

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Elements of Total Acquisition Cost

Contractor Prices

- Market
- Business Strategy
 - o Finance
 - o Technology
 - o **Risk**
 - Contract Types
- Contract
 - o Cost
 - Direct Cost (Labor & Materials)
 - Indirect Cost and G&A
 - o Reserves
 - o **Profit**

Contract Cost is Only One Element of Total Acquisition Cost

Government Procurement Costs

• Policy, Priorities, & Budget

Acquisition Strategy

- System Architecture & Technology
- Cost Estimate & Trades
- Funding Profile & Program
 Schedule
- Contacting Strategy

• Contract Implementation

- o Administrative
- o Technical
- Cost Estimates
- Contract Payments over Life Cycle




Microeconomic Models of Markets

Buyers Sellers	One	Few	Many	Sellers' Influence on Price
One	Bilateral Monopoly Example: FAA/US ATC Eq. Price: P _{BM} Negotiated Monopsony ≥ P _{BM} ≤ Monopoly	Monopoly Oligopsony Example: OPEC Eq. Price: Indeterminate	Monopoly Example: Utility Eq. Price: P _M Highest	Total
Few	Oligopoly Monopsony Example: US Navy Submarines Eq. Price: Indeterminate	Bilateral OligopolyExample:US Govt.SpaceEq. Price:P _{BO} Indet.,Gen.Negotiated > P _C	Oligopoly Example: Petroleum Eq. Price: Price > P _C	Significant
Many	Monopsony Example: Labor Eq. Price: P _m < P _C but Not Efficient, Output is Less	Oligopsony Example: 21st Cent. Ag. Eq. Price: Indeterminate	Perfect Competition Example: None, ~19th Cent. Ag. Eq. Price: P _C Low, Efficient	None
Buyers' Influence on Price	Total	Significant	None	

Competition in the Large Contract Government Market is Imperfect

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Bilateral Oligopoly Market with Cooperation, Negotiation & Competition



<mark>×Price Fixing is Illegal in Some Markets</mark>×

Bilateral Oligopoly Market Becomes Monopolistic with Cooperation & Collusion





U. S. Gov't vs. Com'l Large Contracts Markets

	U. S. Government	Commercial	
Market Structure	Oligopoly Monopsony & Bilateral Oligopoly	Bilateral Oligopoly	
Program Decision Criteria	 Maximize Return to Constituents Citizens & Congress Warfighter Capabilities Observation & Science Data Socioeconomic Federal Budget Technology 	 Maximize Return to Shareholders Value to Customer Technology 	
Metrics	 Total Cost of Program Government Cost Contractor Price Schedule Jobs System Technical Performance 	 Market Value (Share Price) Time Adjusted Financial Return Intellectual Assets Repeat Contracts System Technical Performance 	

Gov't Market is more Concentrated with Different Decision Criteria/Metrics

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U. S. Gov't vs. Com'l Spacecraft Large Contracts

	U. S. Government		Commercial	
	Development	Non-Development	Development	Non- Development
Requirements	Incomplete Defined & Major Changes	Defined & Limited Changes	Defined & Some Changes	Well Defined & Fixed Changes
Funding	Variable in Amount, Profile & Certainty	Variable in Amount, Profile & Certainty	Variable in Amount & Profile	Generally Fixed in Amount & Profile
Schedule	Variable	Variable	Variable	Fixed
Contract Type	Cost	Fixed	Fixed	Fixed
Contract Duration	~10 years	5 > ~10 years	3-7 years	3-4 years
Profits	Limited, ~Cost	May be Limited	Not Limited	Not Limited
Incentives	Cost, Schedule & Performance	Cost, Schedule & Performance	NA	Performance
Penalties	Cost Sharing	NA	NA	Schedule
Oversight	Significant	Variable	Minimum	Minimum
Technology	TRL 6-8	TRL 7-9	Some New	Proven
Examples Launch Communication Observation 	EELVATDRSSWebb	 Pegasus, CCDev WGS NA, Com'l Service 	NAIridiumEarlyBird	ArianeIntelsatIKONOS

Commercial Spacecraft Contracts are Shorter and more Certain



U. S. Gov't Spacecraft Acquisition Alternative Examples under Constrained Budget

	Alternative	Examples	Program Examples	Market Result
Legislative	New Legislation	Extension of Other Transaction (OT) Authority	 DARPA Section 845, Falcon SLV NASA Space Act Agreements, Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) 	Increases Sellers
Acquisition	Programs Re- Architected	 Commonality New Cost Saving Technology Sharing Other US Government Commercial 	 Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Space Environmental NanoSatellite Experiment (SENSE) Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload (CHIRP) 	Increases Buyers & Sellers
	Acquisition Strategy	 Trade Cost vs. Requirements & Schedule Prizes 	 NASA Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) DARPA Grand Challenges 	Increases Sellers
Procure- ment	Contracts	In lieu of FAR 15: • FAR 12 • FAR 14 • Leases	 Wideband Global System (WGS), FM 1-3 LEASAT & DISA COMSAT 	Increases Buyers & Sellers

Acquisition Alternatives under a Constrained Budget Have Examples as Precedents





FAR 15 Versus FAR 12 (Top Level)

FAR 15	FAR 12
Non Commercial Item	Commercial Item
Quote/Bid Process	Market Research
Competitive Offers	Bid Price
Negotiated	Generally Market Price
Cost & Fixed Type Contracts	Fixed Price with Some Exceptions
Development	No Development
Price & Cost Analysis	Price Analysis only
Mandatory Provisions and Contract Clauses	Limited Solicitation Provisions and Contract Clauses with Tailoring in Conjunction with Existing FAR Procedures In Part 13, 14, or 15
Price & Cost Data: Cost Accounting Standards Compliance, and Subcontractor Analysis	GAAP Data only
Contract Administration	Minimum, e.g., Contractor Quality Assurance Systems are Substitute for US Government Inspection And Testing

FAR 12 Can Provide Cost Savings if Government Program Aligns with Commercial Market



U. S. Government Space Systems Acquisition under Constrained Budgets - Recommendations

- Legislative
 - Expand use of Other
 Transaction (OT) Authority
 - Reduce Funding Uncertainty
- Program Architecture
 - Maximize Program Element Commonality
 - Introduce Cost Saving New Technology
 - Increased Sharing/Hosting

Acquisition Costs under a Constrained Budget Must Address all Elements of Total Cost

- Acquisition
 - Increase Program Reserves
 - Trade Cost versus
 Requirements & Schedule
 - Increased use of Prizes for New Technology
- Procurement
 - Maximize use of FAR 12 & Leases
 - Investigate Implications of FAR 14 multi-step bidding
 - Simplify & Increase
 Standardization



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Price Determination - Competition, Monopoly & Monopsony

